substance, but also because whatsoever is incorporeal must needs want sense, and prudence, and pleasure, all which things are included in the notion of God ; and therefore, an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction.—And concerning the soul of

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&c. They who say, that the soul is incorporeal, in any other sense, than as that word iixay be used to signify a subtile body, talk vainly and foolishly ; for then it could neither be able to do nor suffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, because it could touch nothing ; neither could it suffer from any thing, because it could not be . touched by any thing; but it would be just like to vacuum or empty space, which can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only yield bodies a passage through it.—From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was professedly maintained by some philosophers before Epicurus's time.

xxn. But Plato and Aristotle were not the first inventors of it; for it is certain, that all those philosophers, who held the immortality of the human soul, and a God distinct from this visible world (and &o properly the Creator of-it and all its parts), did really assert incorporeal substance. For that a corporeal soul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's understanding, because of its parts being separable from one another; and whosoever • denies God td be incorporeal, if he make him any thing at all, he must needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or else a part of it.—Wherefore, if God be neither of these, he must then be an incorporeal substance. Now Plato

[a] VideDiog, Laert. lib. x. segm. 67, 68. p, 0*30.